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The race to meet the Millennium Development Goals
Thida Khus
NGO ESCR Monitoring Committee/Social Watch Cambodia; SILAKA
Despite the heavy flow of foreign aid into the country, only a small portion went into the national budget. Most of the funds were allocated to projects implemented by a third party, either NGOs or private contractors. So far, reform has gone at a snail’s pace. Serious administrative and structural reform will have to be implemented in order to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. Strengthening the judiciary and the rule of law should be prerequisites for large loans and Official Development Assistance.
Twelve years
have passed since the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, and it is 10 years since
Cambodia had its first election under the sponsorship of the United Nations,
after leaving behind its socialist past. Since then, Cambodia set forth as a
democratic country, with a multiparty system and a free market economy. By the
end of 2003, the country had conducted three parliamentary elections. The
results were unfortunately marred by conflicts after the defeated political
parties contested the results, but in each successive election the country has
moved away from the violence that characterised the previous one. Disputes were
resolved by compromises in which the different parties agreed to share power
between them. After the third election however, the opposition parties demanded
major reforms before a coalition government could be formed. These changes
called for structural reforms in administration and governance, enforcement of
the separation of powers between the three branches of government, and the
resignation of the current Prime Minister, who had been in power for 20 years.
By 31 December 2003 - five months after the election - the political stalemate
continues, and the Prime Minister has not resigned.
For the past 11
years, the Royal Cambodian Government (RCG) has successfully made its way into
the world economy by joining regional and international organisations. Cambodia
has also signed most international conventions. Under the sponsorship of the
international community, with an annual aid flow of over half the national
budget of USD 409 million in 2001,
the country has opened itself up to globalisation with the influx of regional
and international products which have flooded local markets. International aid
for Cambodia is USD 32.2 per capita, ranking second highest among Southeast
Asian countries, after the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. From 1996 to 2001,
Cambodia received a total of USD 2,672 million in foreign aid, USD 190 million
went to budget support, USD 220 million toward humanitarian assistance, and the
rest toward projects implemented by third parties. These projects were aimed at
government capacity building on the one hand, and construction of infrastructure
such as roads and hospitals, on the other. Most funds were not allocated via the
national budget.
The economy and
poverty status
Cambodia’s
annual GDP per capita growth was 2.0% in 1990-1995
and 1.6% in 1996-2000. These rates have not been sufficient to make much
difference to its growing population. Cambodia’s poverty rate is the third
poorest in Southeast Asia, yet the estimated trend to reduce the poverty rate
ranks as the lowest in the region. The prevalence of underweight children
has got worse, 40% to 45% between 1990 and 2001, whereas the population below
the minimum level of dietary energy consumption improved from 43% in 1991 to 36%
in 1998.
Education
The dropout
rate of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5 is the highest in the region,
48.9% in 1998. However, it is only a slight improvement from 49.2% in 1993. The
rate of primary school registration has exceeded expectations, but the school
retention rate (barely 48.2% by grade 5) is not sustained. The number of
literate women compared to men has improved in the last decade. The ratio in
2002 was 0.93, from 0.82 in 1990.
Health
Cambodia’s
health trend looks very dim, compared to other countries in the region. The
under-five mortality rate increased from 115 to 138 per 1,000 live births in
1990-2001.
Cambodia’s MDG to reduce the death rate to 40 per 1,000 live births by 2015 is
unlikely to be attained and if the current trend continues it is more likely to
soar to 165 by 2015.
The HIV/AIDS
adult prevalence rate improved from 1999 to 2000. The rate dropped from 4.7% to
2.98% for young females aged 15-24. Seventy-seven of the 474 people with active
tuberculosis died in 2000. The current rate of 474 tuberculosis cases per
100,000 inhabitants[6]
is considered one of the highest in the region.
Government
policy responses
During the past
11 years, the Government adopted a number of pro-poor policies. The RCG has
successfully attracted the garment industry to invest in the country. Over the
past five years the industry has employed over 240,000 young workers, mainly
women from rural communities. However, in 2001 the creation of 15,000 new jobs
failed to meet the needs of 330,000 people seeking employment. Most of these
people entered the informal sectors, mainly in the agricultural sector.
Inflation has
been stable and the exchange rate has been kept at KHR 3,980 to the US dollar
for the past four years. With the loan from the Asia Development Bank, the RCG
has implemented a rural credit scheme to provide small loans to rural families.
This, however, has failed to strengthen small enterprises owing to the weakness
of the banking sector, a weak legal environment, and the Government’s inability
to control the influx of foreign products. The low capacity of small and medium
enterprises, which prevented them from developing and claiming their part in the
market share, has been due to lack of access to capital, high cost of basic
services such as electricity, gasoline, telephone, and lack of access to
technology. The Government’s inability to control corruption and contraband has
been damaging to businesses trying to compete in the local market.
The Cambodian
Government should be credited with the decision to decentralise the local
administration in early 2002, although this has been hindered by the lack of
progress made by the central Government. Nevertheless 1,600 Cambodian communes
were decentralised for the election of commune councils.
Communes depend on the capacity of the councils and their access to funds in
order to operate. The majority of the commune councils only have access to
administrative funds. Given the inefficiency of revenue collection, commune
funds tend to fall victim to yearly cuts in the national budget. The commune
councils’ accountability to their constituents remains low. Also, the village
leaders remain unchanged, leaving the old administrative infrastructure intact,
so that district offices, which are dominated by the political party in power,
still control the communes.
In 2002, with
support from the World Bank, the Government developed its Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper with participation from civil society. However the plan failed to
prioritise investment in crucial areas, making implementation unrealistic owing
to lack of resources. The process has been judged as short on government
ownership, since the projects were earmarked by the donors from the start.
This has
occurred in the implementation of most projects, which tend to deviate largely
from the initial plan or contract. The lack of transparency is evident in the
management of state affairs of the central Government, from the Ministry of
Finance to the technical ministries. In 2003 the spending of some ministries
largely surpassed the budget approved by the National Assembly, whereas
disbursement for priority ministries, such as Education, Health, and Rural
Development, fell far below the approved level.
Table 1.
Treasury expenditure
(%)
|
Function |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 |
2001 |
|
Core
Government
General Administration
Defence
Security
Judiciary
Economic Services
Agriculture
Transport
Public
Works
Other transport
Other Economic Services
Environmental Protection
Rural Development
Social Services
Health
Recreation, Culture & Religion
Education
Social Protection
Other
Debt
Others |
62.6
17.0
32.5
12.8
0.3
10.8
2.1
3.1
2.6
0.5
5.5
0.2
0.5
19.5
4.8
0.6
9.1
5.0
6.5
6.5
- |
63.2
15.7
32.7
14.6
0.3
14.1
2.6
4.1
2.6
1.5
7.3
0.2
0.4
21.2
5.9
0.8
9.1
5.5
1.0
1.0
- |
69.4
26.0
29.5
13.7
0.2
9.3
1.7
1.8
1.2
0.5
5.7
0.1
0.6
18.8
4.2
0.6
9.4
4.6
1.9
1.9
- |
54.7
19.0
25.2
10.1
0.3
14.2
1.9
2.6
2.2
0.4
9.5
0.2
1.2
26.4
9.4
0.8
11.4
4.8
3.5
2.5
1.11 |
58.9
29.1
20.2
9.3
0.4
12.6
2.3
5.1
4.7
0.4
4.8
0.3
0.8
24.8
6.7
1.8
10.7
5.7
2.9
2.0
0.9 |
51.0
25.7
16.5
8.5
0.4
16.9
3.9
6.4
5.4
1.0
6.1
0.4
1.8
28.1
7.9
1.9
12.9
5.4
2.2
1.8
0.5 |
|
Total |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
Source: Ministry of Finance.
Table 2. Comparison of public
expenditure
(%)
|
Comparators |
Total |
Health |
Education |
|
East Asia &
Pacific
South Asia
Low Income
Vietnam
Lao PDR
Cambodia, incl. External
Cambodia, Government only |
15.0
16.7
18.4
21.2
-
25.3
12.8 |
1.8
1.2
1.2
1.0
2.3
2.9
1.0 |
4.0
3.0
3.8
2.8
2.4
3.0
1.7 |
Source: World Development Indicators, 2002.
Records show
that expenditure is concentrated in the central government, and in the capital
and urban areas, much less so in rural areas, where 79% of the population work
in agriculture, and where 40% of the population live under the poverty line
compared to only 9% in the capital city of Phnom Penh.
Corruption has been repeatedly
identified as a major constraint in Cambodia’s development and a threat to its
poverty reduction and economic growth agenda. Domestic firms cited corruption as
the second most important obstacle to business, while 42% of foreign firms said
corruption was the single most important obstacle for the operation and
development of business.
Irregular
disbursement of public funds and lack of transparent and credible data regarding
public expenditure are serious obstacles to curbing siphoning of public funds to
private pockets. This has created serious problems in the collection of state
revenue to support the functioning of basic government operations.
Summary and
recommendations
Serious
administrative and structural reform must be implemented if the government is to
meet the MDGs by 2015. Despite the heavy flow of foreign aid into the country,
only a small portion went into the national budget. Most of the funds were
allocated to projects implemented by a third party, either NGOs or private
contractors. The government has benefited from these projects through the
capacity building of its institutions and staff; however this effort is not
likely to be sustained if the government does not claim ownership of the
project.
Donors have to
build in a monitoring and evaluating framework with capacity building components
in all projects. Government institutions must be evaluated for organisational
capacity before giving grants. Local organisations should be involved in the
process to help monitor development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation
of all projects. Clear guidelines and policies should be developed for all
stages of their implementation and be transparent to the public. All major
projects must involve the National Assembly as a means of sharing
accountability.
The main focus
should be on strengthening the judiciary and the rule of law. These should be
the prerequisites for large loans and Official Development Assistance (ODA). So
far, reform has gone at a snail’s pace. Responsible giving requires close
monitoring. It also requires the right conditions to help sustain the efforts
involved and make sure that the results of development reach the majority of the
population and not just a privilege few. Lastly, access to information on all
government policies and guidelines related to contracts will help civil society
collaborate in monitoring and evaluating their implementation.
Notes:
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