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Basic economic and social rights denied
Burma Lawyers’ Council
Peaceful co-existence and the guarantee of social security for all persons can be ensured only if the people’s right to self-determination is respected through an accountable, transparent and decentralized system of governance. Above all, the issue of people’s severe lack of access to social security must be resolved by three sectors of society: the state, civil society and individuals.
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As a
country that has prioritized military expenditure over welfare provision
for its people during the past four decades, Burma
has succumbed to an acute economic and social crisis. The ruling State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC), which seized power in 1988, continues to spend over
40% of the national budget on the military, while International Monetary Fund
(IMF) figures estimate that under 1% of the gross domestic product (GDP) is
spent on health and education combined.
Consequently, the people of Burma are systematically denied their basic economic
and social rights, whether it is access to employment, health care, education,
or other fundamental needs.
Hunger is widespread and serious throughout Burma, both in the areas affected by
the ongoing civil war and elsewhere, and it is spreading both geographically and
demographically. The causes of this growing phenomenon have been found to be:
• The destruction of staple crops which provide the local food supply.
• Uncompensated conscription of people to work on state projects which do not
leave enough time for them to work their fields.
• Uncompensated conscription of ‘porters’ to areas far from their villages
leaving them without time to grow food.
• Forced relocation of people to areas where rice is difficult to grow, or to
unfamiliar terrain making it difficult to find enough food.
• A quota system whereby the villagers must provide a set amount of rice to
the government well below the market price, regardless of whether or not the
harvest was adequate, which leaves people in debt and without any rice of their
own to eat (The
People’s Tribunal, 1999).
Malnutrition, child soldiers and theft of women’s hair
Food scarcity has had an especially alarming impact on the health and well-being
of children in Burma. A United Nations report stressed that “the level and
depth of hardship among families in Myanmar
is vividly reflected in high rates of malnutrition among pre-school-aged
children. Even based on official statistics, far too many of Myanmar’s
children suffer from wasting and stunting.” Describing the situation as a
“silent emergency,” the report adds: “Deprivation on this scale indicates
not only immediate need, but also adverse long-term repercussions for the health
and intellectual development of the affected children” (Lallah, 2000a, para. 36, p. 10). According to the UNICEF report The Progress of Nations 2000, 45% of Burmese children under five are
stunted in growth, and according to the World Health Organization (WHO), 39% are
underweight. Food deprivation, repeated illness, lack or absence of health care
and death or forced relocation of parents appear to be the major causes of the
phenomenon of stunted growth in children (Lallah, 2000b, p. 10).
The lack of adequate social protection provided by the state forces people to
seek their own means of survival. The often desperate measures adopted place
people at further risk of vulnerability to exploitation and abuse.
Families that cannot afford to pay for their children’s needs often send them
to work as child soldiers.
Burma is reported to have the highest number of child soldiers in the world
(CSUCS, 2001), with unofficial sources estimating the figure to be around 50,000
(Lallah,
2000b, para. 49, p. 10). Children lacking basic
social security, such as street children, orphans and children belonging to
ethnic minorities, are believed to be the most vulnerable to forced recruitment.
Another indicator of Burma’s lack of social security is the growing number of
reported cases of the theft of women’s hair since 2003. Hair purchasing
centres have dramatically increased in Rangoon, where 1.6 kilograms of hair can
be sold for up to MMK 500,000 (USD 400).
Rising incidents of women’s hair being cut off at crowded places to be sold to
these centres, as well as women who secretly sell their hair to buy food despite
the dignity associated with long hair in Burma, reflect the increasing need of
the population to compensate for their lack of income.
A more alarming trend is the continuing incidence of trafficking of women as a
result of poverty and lack of employment opportunities. Due to the failure of
the state to provide identification documents, these women and girls are denied
their right to travel or migrate legally and thus become vulnerable to
trafficking. Once trafficked, the majority of women and girls are forced into
sex work or sold as wives in China, where they are often exploited and abused
due to their lack of legal status (Kachin Women’s Association Thailand, 2005, p. 22).
Factors
that aggravate social insecurity
A ‘military welfare state’
The principal policy of the SPDC is to strengthen military might through rigid
centralized control. Burma has the highest budget allocation for military
expenditure in Southeast Asia, amounting to over 40% of its national budget,
which excludes hidden accounts and subsidies to the armed forces (Selth, 2002, p. 135).
The size of its army has more than doubled since 1987, from 186,000 personnel to
428,000 in 2004 (Encarta,
2007). It is estimated that arms imports comprise more
than one-fifth of total imports (WLB, 2006).
A related SPDC policy is to create a military-dominated society, or a
‘military welfare state’, as opposed to a social welfare state that ensures
that wealth and security are shared by the majority and nobody is excluded. This
policy has resulted in the under-development of physical infrastructure for the
people, such as electricity, transportation and communication systems. Only an
elite few are able to receive basic health care services or achieve a moderate
level of education (HRDU,
2005b).
The decision by the ruling military junta to move its capital from Rangoon to
Naypyidaw in November 2005 is a case in point. Huge costs have been incurred to
build a vast military complex, golf courses and high-rise government buildings,
yet there are few signs of the schools and hospitals that the government has
promised (Sipress, 2005). Electricity supply to the area, which was already
erratic before the move, has become even more unreliable (McGeown, 2006). In addition, villagers and farmers have been forced off their
land and their properties have been destroyed to make way for the building of
new administrative offices, residential homes and military barracks (Democratic
Voice of Burma, 2005).
In such times of hardship, the people lack unemployment insurance or public
financial support. Despite an existing pension system, civilian pensioners live
in dire need of subsidies as the pensions they receive barely cover the cost of
a few days of food.
Obstacles to civil society and private
sector involvement
The government’s failure to adequately transfer its social security
responsibilities to other sectors is illustrated by the impact of its resistance
to the emergence of civil society inside Burma combined with its convoluted
privatization policy. The SPDC does not cooperate effectively with international
organizations in providing aid to the country’s citizen, while it rigidly
restricts the operations of local people’s organizations.
The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) reports that resources
made available to combat HIV/AIDS are meagre in comparison with the magnitude of
the problem, which is exacerbated by the SPDC’s reluctance to permit
international non-governmental organizations to work in collaboration with
community-based organizations. Permits to visit patients are difficult to obtain
and access to high-risk groups and vulnerable groups is restricted. UNAIDS has
warned of a growing epidemic in Burma and indicated that the ruling regime has
largely been ignoring it (Lallah, 2000a).
Flagrant neglect by the SPDC of its own citizens’ health has resulted in Burma’s
overall performance in health being ranked second-to-last: 190th out of 191
states (WHO, 2000). Its policies in health “still appear to be indecisive and
inadequate” with “wide inequality of access to adequate health care, both
preventive and curative.” (Lallah, 2000b, p. 7). Denied the basic
right to health, some people cross the border to Thailand to receive free
medical assistance at the Mae Tao clinic.
It is estimated that over 100 patients from Burma arrive at the clinic each day.
The poor quality of public health care services is undeniable and must be
addressed urgently throughout the country.
Laws enacted by the SPDC have contributed to the lack of effective privatization
of social security services. For instance, without declaring a privatization
policy, the SPDC enacted the Law Relating to Private Health Care Services on 5
April 2007, which is purportedly aimed at the systematic participation of
private care services as an “integral part” of the national health care
system. However, this law essentially lacks positive foundations for the
successful operation of private health care services. For instance, there is no
provision authorizing them to communicate with the international health
community independently, and receive financial, material and academic
assistance. Nor is there any provision stipulating the obligation of the state
to facilitate access by private health care services to advanced medical
equipment, hospital construction materials, emergency transportation,
communication, electricity and other basic infrastructure, or reduced taxes.
Instead, the law imposes negative prohibitions on private health care services,
and penalties for violations of the law range from a minimum of six months to a
maximum of five years imprisonment.
Similarly, the Law Relating to Forming of Organizations, enacted by the SPDC in 1988, obstructs the formation and independent
functioning of all organizations, including those which attempt to promote the
social welfare of local people. Section 5 vaguely prohibits “organizations that attempt, instigate, incite, abet or commit acts
that may effect [sic] or disrupt the regularity of state machinery,” and
anyone found guilty of such an offence can be punished with a prison term of up
five years. Penalties rendered under the law have created situations in which
organizations operated by local civilian people are strictly controlled on one
hand, while lackey organizations of the SPDC, such as the Union Solidarity
Development Association, Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association and
Myanmar Red Cross – operated by the military leaders, wives and relatives of
the military leaders, ex-army personnel and their cronies – enjoy
opportunities to communicate with the international community and receive
development and social welfare assistance under the guise of civil society.
Deprivation of livelihood and lack of
income security
Farmers are effectively deprived of the right to own land. Under the Land
Nationalization and Agricultural Lands Act of 1953, the transfer, partition or
lease of land can only occur with permission from the authorities. The 1963
Tenancy Act usurped the right of landowners to lease their land, and the 1963
Protection of the Right to Cultivation Act stipulated that land would be
protected from confiscation except in the case of “(a) non-payment of dues
owing to the State, and (b) disputes arising from inheritance cases or actions
taken by the State for security reasons.” (HRDU, 2006).
The regime is further granted authority to confiscate land through Notification
No. 4/78, enacted on 18 September 1978 (HRDU, 2005a).
This notification establishes that failure to sow the allotted land with the
earmarked crops to obtain optimum results, or failure to sell the full crop
quota to the state at the stipulated price, would result in confiscation of
land. Currently village and township administrators have the power to confiscate
land and the cultivators are compelled to follow their dictates with no means to
protest.
The primary reason behind land confiscation and forced displacement of people is
to further extend the SPDC’s military control over the country. This includes
the establishment of military encampments, state enterprises and development
projects to bolster the position of the SPDC. Confiscated land is also often
used to grant concessions to foreign companies, to benefit the SPDC’s lackey
organizations, as well as to obtain access to natural resources.
One example is the continued sale of Burma’s timber to foreign companies.
According to the World Resources Institute (1998), the rate of deforestation has
more than doubled since the present military regime came into power in 1988.
Forest devastation continues in the states of Kachin, Karen and Karenni,
benefiting only the SPDC officials and Chinese companies (PKDS & KESAN,
2004, p.
3-4).
Development projects that have led to forced displacement in Burma include the
construction of infrastructure, mines, irrigation systems, and natural gas and
oil extraction facilities, as well as commercial agricultural fields and
military bases (TBBC,
2005; HRW, 2005). According to Earth Rights International,
“dozens of large-scale dams (15 meters in height) have been already built or
are currently under construction throughout Burma, especially in the central
region of the country.” The construction and resulting water displacement of
these hydroelectric dams necessitate the mass relocation of those living in the
affected area.
In addition, the SPDC relocates villagers not to use the confiscated land
itself, but to undermine the support base of armed opposition groups by severing
their connections to recruits, information, supplies and finances. Known as the
‘four cuts’ policy, this military-based strategy has been implemented by
forcibly relocating villagers from contested areas to SPDC-controlled areas,
thereby isolating villagers from resistance forces and placing them more firmly
under military control (Global IDP Project, 2005).
Recommendations
Burma is a multiethnic society with diverse cultures, religions and traditions.
Ultimately, peaceful co-existence and the guarantee of social security for all
persons can be ensured only if the people’s right to self-determination
is respected through an accountable, transparent and decentralized system of
governance. Within the framework of federalism in which civil society exists in
every constituent unit of the union, the country must embrace a structure of
governance whereby people’s rights and needs can be expressed and protected
through institutionalized inputs to the decision-making processes at all levels
of the administrative system. In essence, the notion of ‘self-rule and shared
rule’ must be respected.
Essentially, the state must take primary responsibility for the social security
of people depending on available natural resources, gross national income, and
state budgets, while promoting the economic, social and cultural rights of
people on one hand and fostering the economic welfare of people on the other,
through a ‘people-centred’ approach as opposed to ‘state-centric’
development programmes. The state is also obliged to respect and promote the
genuine principles of the rule of law with the existence of an independent
judiciary, under which corrupt practices and abuses of power by administrative
officials can be brought to justice and a transparent society can be
established.
The emergence of civil society organizations and institutions will help secure
the right to social security for all. As such, all oppressive laws and other
restrictions imposed on the formation and independent functioning of civil
society organizations must be abrogated, and their communications with the
outside world and among the organizations themselves to seek assistance and
cooperation on social security matters must be institutionalized and legalized.
Social security can also be protected when people live in dignity with a secure
livelihood. To this end, last but not least, the state must guarantee people’s
access to the resources required, in addition to the cancellation of legal and
administrative barriers which hinder equal rights to employment, equal pay for
equal work, and the independent formation and operation of trade unions,
commencing with the right not to be forced to work.
Eventually, the right to social security will become a reality when the inner
dynamics, interconnectedness and interaction between the state, civil society
organizations and capable individuals better reflect the dire need of the
Burmese people.
References
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers
(2001). Global Report 2001.
<www.child-soldiers.org>.
Democratic Voice of Burma (2005).
“Burmese Junta Grabs Land From Farmers to Build Offices at Pyinmana”. 9
November.
Earth Rights International (2005). “Flooding
the Future: Hydropower and Cultural Survival in the Salween River Basin”.
8 December.
Encarta (2007). “Myanmar Facts and Figures 2007” [online]. Available from:
<encarta.msn.com/fact_631504823/Myanmar_Facts_and_Figures.html>.
Global IDP Project (2005). “Burma:
Displacement Continues Unabated in one of the World’s Worst IDP Situations”.
27 June.
HRDU (Human Rights Documentation Unit) (2005a). “Deprivation of Livelihood”
in Human Rights Yearbook 2005.
Available from:
<www.ncgub.net/data/2005HRYearbook/Deprivation_of_Livelihood.htm >.
HRDU (2005b). “Rights to Education and Health” in Human Rights Yearbook 2005. Available from:
<www.ncgub.net/data/2005HRYearbook/Rights_to_Education_and_Health.htm>.
HRDU (2006). Human Rights Yearbook 2006.
HRW (Human Rights Watch) (2005). “They
Came and Destroyed our Village Again: The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons
in Karen State”. New York: HRW.
Kachin Women’s Association Thailand (2005)
Driven Away: Trafficking of Kachin Women on the China-Burma Border.
Lallah, R. (2000a). “Situation of human rights in Myanmar”. Geneva: United
Nations. Report of the Special Rapporteur. Document No. E/CN.4/2000/38. 24
January.
Lallah, R. (2000b). “Situation of human rights in Myanmar”. Geneva: United
Nations. Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur. Document No. A/55/359. 22
August.
McGeown, K. (2006). “Burma’s Confusion over Capital”. BBC News. 17 June.
Pan Kachin Development Society (PKDS) and Karen Environmental and Social Action
Network (KESAN) (2004). Destruction and
Degradation of Burmese Frontier Forests: Listening to People’s Voices. Amsterdam:
Kaboem.
Selth, A. (2002). Burma’s Armed Forces:
Power without Glory. Norwalk CT: Eastbridge.
Sipress, A. (2005). “As Scrutiny Grows, Burma Moves its Capital”. Washington
Post. 28 December.
TBBC (Thailand Burma Border Consortium) (2005). Internal Displacement and
Protection in Eastern Burma. October.
The People’s Tribunal on Food Scarcity and Militarization in Burma (1999). Voice
of the Hungry Nation [online]. 15 October. Available from:
<www.foodjustice.net/burma/1996-2000tribunal/report/index.htm>.
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2000). Human Development Report 2000.
WLB (Women’s League of Burma) (2006). “Women demand an immediate end to war crimes in Burma” [online].
Position paper prepared for the Sixth Anniversary of Security Council
Resolution 1325 (2000). 23-27 October. Available from:
<www.womenofburma.org/Statement&Release/1325lobby2006.pdf>.
WHO (World Health Organization) (2000). World
Health Report 2000 - Health Systems: Improving Performance. Available from:
<www.who.int/whr/2000/en/index.html>.
World Resources Institute (1998). Logging
Burma’s Frontier Forests: Resources and the Regime. Available from:
<pubs.wri.org/pubs_description.cfm?PubID=2928>.
Notes:
Although the ruling military junta officially changed the English
version of the country’s name from Burma
to Myanmar in 1989, Burmese
opposition groups continue to use the name Burma because they do not recognize
the legitimacy of the military government.
Figures from Kachin
Women’s Association Thailand (2005, p. 15). See also UNDP (2000), which
reported Burma’s allocation of public resources at 0.2% of GDP.
Paulo Sérgio
Pinheiro, Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights on the situation
of human rights in Myanmar since 2001, has not been allowed to visit the country
since November 2003. Consequently, political discussions with the Government of
Myanmar have taken place only outside the country on limited occasions.
Voice of America, 25
April 2007 [in Burmese].
The Kantarawaddy Times,
16 May 2007 [in Burmese].
Nightingale, 9 January
2007 [in Burmese].
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