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The high cost of private monopolies
Mageswari Sangaralingam; Meenakshi Raman
Consumers’ Association of Penang
Privatisation policies have been limited to a small elite who took over profitable public utilities and turned them into private monopolies. On several occasions, the objective of reduced fiscal burden backfired, as the government had to pay higher costs to bail out failed privatisations. For consumers, price increases have not brought about benefits. There is a serious need to review the entire privatisation policies to make the process more accountable and transparent.
Lack
of transparency in an oligarchic economy
The
government first announced the policy of privatisation in 1983. It represented a
new approach to national development, complementing other policies such as
Malaysia Incorporated, which was designed to increase the role of the private
sector in economic development. Among the objectives were to reduce the
financial and administrative burden on the government, to improve efficiency and
productivity, and to facilitate economic growth.
The
mechanisms used for privatisation have been diverse and include the sale of
equity or assets, lease of assets, management contracts, build-operate-transfer
or build-own-operate, build-transfer, and management buy out.[1] Sale of equity predominates in agriculture,
manufacturing, finance, real estate and business, while build-own-operate is
more dominant in infrastructure, such as electricity, gas and water.
From
the outset, privatisation has been non-transparent. At the beginning, it was
mainly done on a "first come first serve" basis. Projects that had
been identified for privatisation, including those that were highly profitable
under public ownership, were often awarded to individuals or companies with
political connections, including United Engineers Malaysia, Fleet Group, Renong,
Vincent Tan Chee Yioun and Ananda Krishnan, without payment. The entire
privatisation process continues behind closed doors and beyond public
accountability.
Initially,
the public understood that only unprofitable enterprises would be privatised.
However, ultimately even the most profitable state-owned enterprises like
Telekom Malaysia (telecommunication services), Tenaga Nasional (electricity
provider) and Pos Malaysia (postal services) have been privatised. National
infrastructure assets, such as toll roads and key services of government
hospitals, were awarded to Malaysian business groups, which were given long-term
concessions to operate the ventures. In many cases, privatisation has
transformed public monopolies into private ones, which too often have become the
property of a select group of politically well-connected business tycoons,
rendering the Malaysian economy more oligarchic.
The
privatisation plan appeared to work well from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s.
Boasting bullish cash-flow forecasts, companies involved in privatisation
projects easily tapped capital markets and banks to finance their long-term,
capital-intensive ventures. However, when the economic crisis hit in 1997, many
of these companies were exposed as cash-poor and debt-heavy. Now the government
is confronted with the awkward prospect of having to re-nationalise some of the
country's privatised ventures.
Privatisation
has caused fiscal problems because the government has had to bail out failed
privatisation projects. In 2000, it paid more than MYR 192 million (USD 51
million) to re-nationalise sewage services. At that time, Bernard Dompok, a
minister in the Prime Minister's Department, called sewage services a
"special case" as the government had to "safeguard public
interest and to avoid service disruptions". However, since then the
government has also reacquired Malaysia Airlines and is in the process of taking
over the Renong conglomerate and two urban light-rail transit systems for almost
MYR 9 billion (USD 2.4 billion).
More
worrisome are recent moves to privatise basic services like water, education and
health care, which have all been widely accessible at a very low cost,
especially for lower income people.
Water:
the unfulfilled promise of governmental tariff control
In
March 2002, the Malaysian Works Minister, Datuk Seri S. Samy Vellu, said that
the Government may have to privatise water management to reduce the financial
burden on state governments.[2]
According to the Minister, the privatisation proposal followed the Asian
Development Bank’s recommendation to open up and privatise water management.
He gave the assurance that water tariffs would always be subject to government
control. Nevertheless, the Minister’s proposal came under fire from consumer
groups, such as the Consumers' Association of Penang, who argued that water is an essential public resource that must be
controlled and managed by the government in the public interest.
Water
authorities in several states (such as Johor, Penang and Kelantan) have already
been privatised, and those in Selangor and Terengganu have been corporatised
(run as companies but owned by the government). In the state of Penang, the
Water Board has been privatised despite being one of the best managed and most
profitable water authorities in the country. Five other states are expected to
complete the privatization or corporatisation of their water supply during the
Eighth Malaysia plan period of 2001-2005.
Privatisation
of the country’s water supplies is likely to involve a review of the existing
tariff structure. Despite assurance to consumers that water rates would always
remain under the government’s purview, in April 2001, the price for domestic
users in Selangor was increased to MYR 0.57 (USD 0.15) per cubic meter from MYR
0.42 (USD 0.11) for consumption of 20 cubic meters or less. Consumers protested,
claiming that the increase was not justified because of the poor quality of
piped water. Although rate increases are currently under government control,
they are still open to lobbying by the water companies. The imposition of
full-cost water pricing as a result of privatisation will only deprive more
people of access to safe water by forcing poor communities to seek alternative
sources. Uniform price increases for water use will also result in greater
inequities between rich and poor.
Health
care: increased costs without improvement in quality
The
existing government health care delivery system has placed 90% of Malaysian
citizens within an hour or 5km of a health centre and has been lauded by the
World Health Organization as one of the most equitable health services in the
Pacific region. However, the welfare system is threatened by privatisation.
In
the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000), the government alluded to its intention
to privatise medical services. This policy came under severe attack from
consumer and other public interest groups and was not pursued by the government.
Significantly, the subsequent Eighth Malaysia Plan, which charts
the strategies and programmes to be undertaken by the federal government during
2001-2005, does not refer to the privatisation of medical services.
However, the government has moved
to corporatise public hospitals.
Many
government hospital services, including pharmaceuticals and medical supply, as
well as support services, had already been privatised in 1994 and 1996
respectively. These measures increased costs to the government, including higher
drug prices, without a commensurate improvement in the services provided. The
privatisation of the five hospital support services in 1996 (laundry, hospital
equipment, facilities maintenance, cleaning services, and clinical waste
disposal) increased operational costs four to five times.
In
1994, Malaysia's drug distribution system, which was run by the government's
General Medical Store (GMS) was privatised, and state hospitals were required to
procure their supplies from a new company, Southern Task Sdn. Bhd. (STSB), a
subsidiary of Renong. An indication of the overall dismal performance of STSB
was the move to change to another entity called Remedi Pharmaceuticals Sdn. Bhd.
(PPSB) in 1996. A 1996/97 study carried out by the School of Pharmaceutical
Sciences, University Sains Malaysia, found that privatisation of GMS has not
resulted in any significant improvement in the overall drug distribution system.[3]
On the contrary, the weighted price of drugs supplied in 1997 increased 3.2
fold.
Presently,
patients are increasingly being asked to
purchase their own medical supplies, such as drugs and surgical equipment,
before being treated. Malaysians are rightly concerned as to whether the
proposed corporatisation of government hospitals will similarly lead to sharply
increased health care costs, particularly for the poor, elderly and chronically
ill, as well as compromise the quality of publicly-funded medical care for all
Malaysians.
Privatisation
of education
Privatisation
or corporatisation of institutions of higher education creates disparities in
access. In anticipation of university corporatisation as well as the
establishment of private universities, Parliament passed two new Acts in 1996,
namely the National Higher Education Council Act and Private Higher Education
Institutions Act. The University and University Colleges Act was also amended to
contain provisions that allow the universities to initiate or participate in all
forms of business.
In
fact, two systems have emerged: higher quality private education for those who
can afford it and poorer quality public education for those with low incomes.
Universities have also undergone corporatisation since 1998. Consequently, fees
have already gone up. Once again, such increases will adversely affect the lower
income group. Despite promises that there will be more grants and scholarships,
the government shifted the burden of educational costs on to students and their
families.
Privatisation
of sewage treatment and solid waste disposal
The
privatisation of sewage treatment in 1993 in Malaysia was a major financial
failure, as the company which was awarded the contract made huge losses and had
to be bought back by the government in June 2000. Indah Water Konsortium (IWK),
a company formed in 1993, was given a 28-year contract and assigned the
responsibility of operating public sewage treatment facilities.
The
company did not do well partly because a significant proportion of the public
refused to pay their sewage bills, which had been previously paid under
municipal charges. The treatment of sewage and wastewater remains in a
deplorable state. Moreover, the company failed to treat water effectively. In
1999, less than 17% of the 5,409 treatment plants run by IWK complied with
government discharge standards.[4]
The
privatisation of solid waste disposal services in 1995 experienced several
delays and was not fully implemented. Four
regional consortiums were chosen to manage solid waste. Before privatisation
itself is implemented, a Municipal Solid Waste Act has to be formulated. The
government agreed that the consortiums could take over in stages by means of an
interim service contract before the bill is passed. The local authorities will
pay for the services rendered by the consortium. Our concern is that upon
privatisation, the companies will charge consumers directly and increase fees.
Meanwhile,
solid waste management continues to be a serious problem for many urban centres.
Sanitary and waste problems are magnified significantly in high density, lower
income urban areas with low cost apartments, squatters and other settlements
occupied by low-income groups.
GATS
and privatisation
Negotiations
under the General Agreement on Trade in Services to liberalise the services
sector are currently underway in the WTO.
In
a confidential document leaked in April 2002, the EU requested Malaysia to open
up, inter alia, its postal and courier
services, telecommunications, energy and environmental services, including water
supply and solid waste management. Civil groups fear that the EU is pressuring
Malaysia behind the scenes to accept its requests. While the Malaysian public is
being burdened by more privatisation of key public sector goods and services,
pressures to hand over these areas to foreign companies add to concerns.
However, NGOs within the country, such as the Third World Network and the
Consumers Association of Penang, continue to pressure the government to ensure
that these sectors are not subject to liberalisation.
Conclusion
The
promised benefits of the government’s privatisation policy have not been
realised. The benefits have been limited to a small elite who took over
profitable public utilities and turned them into private monopolies. On several
occasions, the objective of reduced fiscal burden backfired, as the government
has had to pay higher costs for supplies and bail out failed privatisation. For
ordinary consumers, price increases have not brought about commensurate benefits
or improved services. Hence, there is a serious need to review the entire
privatisation policies of the government and to make the process more
accountable and transparent.
References
Economic
Planning Unit. “Eighth Malaysia Plan”. Malaysia, 2001.
Economic
Planning Unit. “Privatisation Master Plan”. Malaysia, 1991.
Hanim
Adnan. “Pos Malaysia Privatisation Complete, Says Government”. The
Star, 24 August 2001.
S.
Jayasankaran. “Raising a Stink”. The
Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 September 2001.
Leslie
Lopez. “Malaysia Prepares to Take Control of Ailing Sewer System”.
Asian Wall Street Journal, 21 Febuary 2000.
V.
Raina, A. Chowdury and S. Chowdury, Editors. The Dispossessed--Victims of Development in Asia. p. 222.
Syed
Husin Ali. “Privatisation and
Corporatisation in Malaysia: Meaning, Policy, Practise”. Presented at the National
Conference on Privatisation and Health Care Financing,
1997 in Malaysia, USM, Penang.
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